Evans v. Newton

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

No. 61 Argued: November 9-10, 1965 --- Decided: January 17, 1966
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1911, United States Senator Augustus O. Bacon executed a will that devised to the Mayor and Council of the City of Macon, Georgia, a tract of land which, after the death of the Senator's wife and daughters, was to be used as "a park and pleasure ground" for white people only, the Senator stating in the will that, while he had only the kindest feeling for the Negroes, he was of the opinion that, "in their social relations, the two races (white and negro) should be forever separate." The will provided that the park should be under the control of a Board of Managers of seven persons, all of whom were to be white. The city kept the park segregated for some years, but, in time, let Negroes use it, taking the position that the park was a public facility which it could not constitutionally manage and maintain on a segregated basis. [n1]

Thereupon, individual members of the Board of Managers of the park brought this suit in a state court against the City of Macon and the trustees of certain residuary beneficiaries of Senator Bacon's estate, asking that the city be removed as trustee and that the court [p298] appoint new trustees, to whom title to the park would be transferred. The city answered, alleging it could not legally enforce racial segregation in the park. The other defendants admitted the allegation and requested that the city be removed as trustee.

Several Negro citizens of Macon intervened, alleging that the racial limitation was contrary to the laws and public policy of the United States, and asking that the court refuse to appoint private trustees. Thereafter the city resigned as trustee and amended its answer accordingly. Moreover, other heirs of Senator Bacon intervened and they and the defendants other than the city asked for reversion of the trust property to the Bacon estate in the event that the prayer of the petition were denied.

The Georgia court accepted the resignation of the city as trustee and appointed three individuals as new trustees, finding it unnecessary to pass on the other claims of the heirs. On appeal by the Negro intervenors, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that Senator Bacon had the right to give and bequeath his property to a limited class, that charitable trusts are subject to supervision of a court of equity, and that the power to appoint new trustees so that the purpose of the trust would not fail was clear. 220 Ga. 280, 138 S.E.2d 573. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 380 U.S. 971.

There are two complementary principles to be reconciled in this case. One is the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to express his preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses. The other is the constitutional ban in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state-sponsored racial inequality, which, of course, bars a city from acting as trustee under a private will that serves the racial segregation cause. Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. [p299] 230. A private golf club, however, restricted to either Negro or white membership is one expression of freedom of association. But a municipal golf course that serves only one race is state activity indicating a preference on a matter as to which the State must be neutral. [n2] What is "private" action and what is "state" action is not always easy to determine. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715. Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action. The action of a city in serving as trustee of property under a private will serving the segregated cause is an obvious example. See Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, supra. A town may be privately owned and managed, but that does not necessarily allow the company to treat it as if it were wholly in the private sector. Thus, we held in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, that the exercise of constitutionally protected rights on the public streets of a company town could not be denied by the owner. A State is not justified, we said, in "permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties. . . ." Id. at 509. We have also held that, where a State delegates an aspect of the elective process to private groups, they become subject to the same restraints as the State. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461. That is to say, when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State, and subject to its constitutional limitations.

Yet generalizations do not decide concrete cases. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances" [p300] (Burton v. Wilmingtor Parking Authority, supra, at 722) can we determine whether the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to a particular case. The range of governmental activities is broad and varied, and the fact that government has engaged in a particular activity does not necessarily mean that an individual entrepreneur or manager of the same kind of undertaking suffers the same constitutional inhibitions. While a State may not segregate public schools so as to exclude one or more religious groups, those sects may maintain their own parochial educational systems. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510.

If a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one race only, and in no way implicated the State in the supervision, control, or management of that facility, we assume arguendo that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered. [n3] [p301]

This park, however, is in a different posture. For years, it was an integral part of the City of Macon's activities. From the pleadings, we assume it was swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained by the city as a public facility for whites only, as well as granted tax exemption under Ga.Code Ann. § 92-201. The momentum it acquired as a public facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of "private" trustees. So far as this record shows, there has been no change in municipal maintenance and concern over this facility. Whether these public characteristics will in time be dissipated is wholly conjectural. If the municipality remains entwined in the management or control of the park, it remains subject to the restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment just as the private utility in Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462, remained subject to the Fifth Amendment because of the surveillance which federal agencies had over its affairs. We only hold that, where the tradition of municipal control had become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector.

This conclusion is buttressed by the nature of the service rendered the community by a park. The service rendered even by a private park of this character is municipal in nature. It is open to every white person, there being no selective element other than race. Golf [p302] clubs, social centers, luncheon clubs, schools such as Tuskegee was, at least in origin, [n4] and other like organizations in the private sector are often racially oriented. A park, on the other hand, is more like a fire department or police department that traditionally serves the community. Mass recreation through the use of parks is plainly in the public domain, Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, and state courts that aid private parties to perform that public function on a segregated basis implicate the State in conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Like the streets of the company town in Marsh v. Alabama, supra, the elective process of Terry v. Adams, supra, and the transit system of Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, supra, the predominant character and purpose of this park are municipal.

Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot but conclude that the public character of this park requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state law. We may fairly assume that, had the Georgia courts been of the view that, even in private hands, the park may not be operated for the public on a segregated basis, the resignation would not have been approved and private trustees appointed. We put the matter that way because, on this record, we cannot say that the transfer of title per se dissentangled the park from segregation under the municipal regime that long controlled it.

Since the judgment below gives effect to that purpose, it must be and is

Reversed.

1. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526. And see Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (beaches and bathhouses).

2. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879; New Orleans Park Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54.

3. It is argued that this park was a product of Georgia's policy to allow charitable trusts of public facilities to be segregated. A Georgia statute permitted any person to grant a municipal corporation land in trust to the public use as a park on a racially segregated basis. Ga.Code Ann. § 69-504. And a companion measure authorized municipal corporations to accept such grants and to enforce the racial limitations. Id. § 69-505. This policy, it is urged, had a "coercive effect" (Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 273) implicating Georgia in racial discrimination, for, without that legislative pattern for segregation, a testator would have had to travel an uncertain course to reach that end. Before § 69-504 was enacted in 1905, an attempt to establish a trust such as this would have faced numerous difficulties. The pre-1905 statutory law did not expressly include parks as a proper subject of charitable trusts, although it was specific in other regards. See Ga.Code § 4008 (1895). And Georgia's public parks were conceived of as "dedicated" commons with an easement in favor of the general public. See Mayor & Council of Macon v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239. The concept of dedication meant that the property was to benefit the public as a whole. Ford v. Harris, 95 Ga. 97, 101, 22 S.E. 144, 145; East Atlanta Land Co. v. Mower, 138 Ga. 380, 388, 75 S.E. 418, 422. It would have posed conceptual difficulties, to say the least, to dedicate land to the public as a whole, at the same time excluding the members of the Negro race. Cf. Brown v. Gunn, 75 Ga. 441, in which this point was disposed of only by finding that, on the particular facts of that case, there was no "dedication." We think it likely that it was the very difficulties discussed here that § 6504 was intended to eliminate. We do not, however, reach the question whether the State facilitated, through this legislative action, the establishment of segregated parks.

4. Ala.Laws 1880-1881, pp.395-396; Ala.Laws, 1882-1883, pp. 392-393.
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